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Injunction and granted Unisys1 Motion to Dismiss.

Olds timely

appealed that Order and seeks a remand with instructions to the
District Court.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On July 30, 1987, Olds filed an action to enjoin Unisys

from altering a building which Unisys occupied under a lease from
Olds.

R.I-1 to 7.-'

The trial court granted Olds a temporary

restraining order and ordered Unisys to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue.
motion to dismiss the action.

R.1-105.

Unisys then filed a

The court held a non-evidentiary

hearing on August 24, 1987 and an evidentiary hearing on September 28, 1987.
The trial court found that in the course of the leasehold Unisys had transformed the building from a warehouse to a
high-technology manufacturing facility.

Tr.11-116.

The court

also found that Unisys was removing permanently-affixed walls
from the building, causing damage to Olds' property.

_Id. The

court held, however, that Unisys1 actions did not violate the
lease agreements as Olds claimed.

i/

Tr.11-116 to 120. The court

The two volumes of the Record on Appeal, as paginated by the
District Court Clerk, are designated R.I and R.II respectively; the transcripts of the two hearings are designated
Tr.I and Tr.II. References in the brief are to Volume followed by page number.
-2-

granted the Motion to Dismiss and denied Olds1 Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.
After the court's oral ruling dismissing the action,
Unisys filed a counterclaim.

On March 17f 1988, the trial court

entered an order dismissing Unisys' counterclaim, whereupon its
earlier order dismissing the action became a final order.

Olds

timely filed its notice of appeal on April 15, 1988.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 16, 1964, Deshon Properties Corporation, as

lessor ("Deshon"), entered into a lease (the "Original Lease")
with General Motors Corporation, as lessee, for a building
located in Davis County, Utah (the "Premises").

Exhibit P-l.

On

December 20, 1972, General Motors entered into a sublease (the
"Sublease") for the Premises with Unisys's predecessor in interest, Sperry Rand Corporation (Unisys and its predecessors in
interest are referred to as "Unisys" or "Tenant").

Exhibit P-2.

As a result of transactions occurring between 1974 and March
1986, Olds acquired the interests of both Deshon and General
Motors in the Premises.

Tr.11-47 to 49.

-3-

Unisys, on December 4, 1984, executed a Tenant Estoppel
2/
Certification and Attornment (the "Attornment").

Exhibit P-4.-7

The Attornment provided, inter alia, that the Sublease would continue as the lease between the parties, except that provisions of
the Original Lease which did not diminish the Tenant's obligations or the Landlord's rights under the Sublease would be incorporated into the Sublease.

Ld.

The Lease, the Sublease and the

Attornment (collectively, the "Lease Documents") provide the
framework governing the relationship between Olds, as Landlord,
and Unisys, as Tenant.
Although Unisys' lease term does not expire until March
31, 1989, in late 1986, Unisys reduced its manufacturing operation at the Premises and began to make substantial alterations to
the Premises.

Exhibits P-2 and P-6.

Olds filed this action to

enjoin Unisys from destroying alterations Unisys had made to the
Premises.

Olds alleged, pursuant to the Lease Documents, that

Unisys has no right to destroy permanent improvements affixed to
the Property without first obtaining Olds' written consent.
Unisys is engaged in substantial alterations of the
Premises, including the demolition and removal of permanent

2/

Attornment agreements are routinely employed in such circumstances to acknowledge the tenant's recognition of its obligation to the new landlord.
-4-

walls, suspended ceiling panels, light fixtures and shelving.
Tr.11-91 to 103.

By removing certain improvements (those

installed by Unisys in the process of transforming the Premises
to a high-tech facility) Unisys is causing permanent damage to
the Premises. Id.

For instance, the trial court found that

removal of walls by Unisys was damaging the Premises. Tr.11-116.
Olds1 claim is based on unambiguous language in the
first clause of Paragraph 21 of the Sublease (the "Alterations
Clause").

The Alterations Clause states that "Lessee will not

make any alterations or add any construction whatsoever to the
premises without the prior written consent of the Lessor, and in
each instance, such a request for consent shall include a set of
plans, specifications and cost of any contemplated improvement...."

Exhibit P-2, Addendum A.
After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled

that the Tenant was not required to seek approval for its actions
because it was "restoring" the building pursuant to other provisions of the Lease Documents.

Tr.11-117. The court relied upon

the second clause of Paragraph 21 of the Sublease (the "Restoration Clause"), which states that:
[I]f the lessee makes any alterations or adds any construction, such additional construction or alterations
shall be removed at the expiration of the term and the
premises shall be restored at the sole expense of the
Lessee to the condition existing prior to Lessee's taking possession, except for improvements of the
-5-

following nature which shall remain on the premises at
the time Lessee vacates the premises: ... [enumerated
list of exceptions].
Exhibit P-2, Addendum A.
The trial court had in evidence Unisys' own written
interpretation of the Restoration Clause which reflected the parties' mutual understanding that Olds could waive Unisys' obligation to restore.

Unisys had in fact written to Olds in contem-

plation of terminating the lease and had affirmed the "landlord's
right to waive" and Olds' option to "waive that paragraph and
accept all the improvements provided by [Unisys]."
Addendum B.

Exhibit P-6,

The trial court held that evidence of the parties'

mutual understanding of Olds' right to waive was immaterial.
Tr.11-54 to 63, Addendum C.

Thus, Olds was denied its contrac-

tual right under the Alterations Clause or as implied from the
Restoration Clause to obtain written notice of Unisys' alteration
plans —

the basis by which Olds might determine whether to

enforce or waive the restoration requirement.
Olds attempted repeatedly at the hearing to introduce
additional evidence proving the consistent recognition by Unisys
that Olds could choose to waive the Restoration Clause and that
the clause was intended to benefit the Landlord.

But the trial

court disallowed introduction of any further evidence offered on
this point.

Id.

Course-of-performance evidence was excluded not
-6-

only because the court characterized it as immaterial, but also
because the court allotted very limited time to the evidentiary
hearing.

Tr.11-103 to 105.
The trial court also held that Section 10.02 of the

Original Lease granted Unisys the right to remove permanent
walls, ceilings and other improvements.

Tr.11-118. The Original

Lease states that:
It is understood and agreed that the Lessee, from time
to time during the term of this Lease or any extension
thereof, may install machinery, equipment and fixtures
of various kinds and description for the purpose of
carrying on its business, and upon any of such machinery, equipment and fixtures being so installed in or
placed on the leased premises by the Lessee the same
shall remain at all times the property of the Lessee,
and, at any time during the term or any extension or
extensions thereof, and at the termination of the Lease
or any extension or extensions thereof, the Lessee
shall be entitled to remove any and all of such machinery, equipment and fixtures; provided, however, that if
any machinery and equipment is so attached to any
building or buildings so as not to be readily removable
without damage to the building or buildings, then, in
such event, if the Lessee shall remove the same, the
Lessee shall promptly repair and replace any damage
caused to the building or buildings by such removal.
Section 10.02, Exhibit P-l, Addendum D (emphasis added).
However, by the terms of the Attornment, Section 10.02,
as a pro-Tenant provision of the Original Lease, was not incorporated into the Sublease.

Exhibit P-4, Addendum E.

By citing

Section 10.02 in reaching its conclusion, the court misinterpreted the Attornment, which by its terms incorporates into the
-7-

Sublease only those elements of the Original Lease that favor the
Landlord.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Sublease requires Unisys to obtain Olds1 prior
written consent before making any alteration to the Premises.
Although the Sublease also requires Unisys to remove its alterations and restore the Premises at the termination of the lease,
that Restoration Clause is for the Landlord's benefit.
can waive a provision that is for its benefit.

A party

Furthermore, the

written communication between the parties shows their mutual
understanding that Olds could waive the Restoration Clause.

In

contravention of those Sublease provisions, the trial court's
ruling permits Unisys to alter and damage the Premises without
Olds1 permission.
Courts hearing preliminary injunction motions must consider all relevant evidence bearing on the propriety of the
injunction sought.

The court cannot properly exercise its dis-

cretion whether to grant or deny an injunction without considering all of the relevant evidence necessary to establish harm and
the likelihood of success on the merits.

Since the trial court

found the necessary harm to Olds1 property, only evidence of
Olds' likelihood of success on the legal issues was necessary for
the entry of an injunction.

Yet the court refused to consider
-8-

proffered evidence on the most important legal issue:

the par-

ties1 mutual understanding of Olds1 right to waive the Restoration Clause.
The excluded evidence would have further substantiated
Unisys1 acceptance of Olds1 right to relieve Unisys of its obligation to remove permanently attached improvements made to the
Premises.

Under Utah lawf the parties' performance and construc-

tion of a contract term determines the meaning of that term.

The

trial court's refusal to admit such material evidence prevented
Olds from receiving a fair hearing.
The trial court also ignored the effect of the
Attornment on the Original Lease and the Sublease. The
Attornment makes the Sublease the governing instrument and incorporates only those provisions of the Original Lease which do not
diminish the Landlord's rights.

Because Section 10.02 of the

Original Lease "entitled" the Tenant to remove fixturesf it was a
pro-Tenant provision diminishing the Landlord's right under the
Sublease to elect whether to impose a duty to restore.

Section

10.02 is therefore not incorporated into the Sublease. Nevertheless the trial court ruled that Section 10.02 afforded Unisys the
right to destroy permanently attached improvements, implicitly
ignoring the effect of the Attornment.

-9-

The trial court erred in interpreting the Restoration
Clause of the Sublease, in interpreting the written course-ofperformance evidence about waiver, and in interpreting the
Attornment.

The trial court also committed reversible error by

excluding additional course-of-performance evidence.

Since

injury was established, Olds is entitled to an order reversing
the holding of the trial court and remanding the action for entry
of the injunction.

At the very least, the matter should be

remanded for a new hearing consistent with this Court's ruling
(1) that Unisys has no right to alter the Premises without Olds1
permission, (2) that Unisys conceded Olds1 right to waive the
Restoration Clause by its letter of acknowledgement and that Olds
was therefore entitled to waive restoration of the Premises and
to keep the improvements, (3) that all course-of-performance evidence should be admitted, and (4) that the Attornment obviated
any right to remove fixtures contained in Section 10.02 of the
Original Lease.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE RESTORATION CLAUSE
A.

Olds Can Waive the Restoration Clause Because the Provision is for Olds' Benefit
The Sublease requires Unisys to seek permission for

alterations and to restore the Premises at termination of the

-10-

lease.

The provision is worded as a Tenant duty (". . . the

premises shall be restored at the sole expense of the Lessee
. . . .") and exists for the Landlord's benefit.

Although the

Landlord might permit alterations useful to the Tenant during the
term of the lease, the Restoration Clause allows the Landlord to
compel the Tenant to restore the Premises to its original condition or to accept the changes if the Landlord deems them useful.
The Alterations Clause, by requiring the Tenant to seek the
Landlord's written permission before making alterations, provides
the mechanism by which the Landlord can intelligently exercise
his choice.

Alternatively, the Restoration Clause itself implies

the Landlord's right to know the Tenant's plans so that the Landlord can decide whether to waive or enforce restoration.
General principles of law permit a party to waive contract provisions included for that party's benefit.

Pruitt v.

Pavelin, 685 P.2d 1347 (Ariz. App. 1984).

Accordingly, Olds is

entitled to waive the Restoration Clause.

Such a waiver need not

even be expressly declared by the party, but may be implied from
the party's conduct.

Reynolds Metal Co. v. Electric Smith Con-

struction and Equipment Co., 483 P.2d 880, 883 (Wash. App. 1971).
Certainly by seeking a preliminary injunction, Olds engaged in
conduct consistent with its right to waive.

-11-

Olds sought a

preliminary injunction in order to force Unisys to supply the
information necessary for Olds to intelligently exercise its
rights.
B.

Olds Can Waive the Restoration Clause Because Both Olds
and Unisys Interpreted the Clause to Permit Waiver
Unisys recognized Olds1 right to waive the Restoration

Clause in its letter that invited Olds to waive and to keep all
improvements.

The letter sets forth the parties1 mutual lease

interpretation that should be enforced by this Court.
Under Utah law, courts are to consider the way the parties have construed their contract and the way the parties have
performed as evidence of the true meaning of the contract.

For

example, in Zeese v. Estate of Siqel, 534 P.2d 85, 90 (Utah
1975), the Utah Supreme Court held that a Landlord's acquiescence
in a Tenant's use establishes the meaning the court should
enforce.

The Court stated:

"The parties, by their action and

performance, have demonstrated what was their meaning and intent;
the contract should be so enforced by the courts."

Id.

Likewise, Eie v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d
1190, 1195 (Utah 1981), held that the parties1 course of dealing
should be examined to determine their intentions.

In Eie, plain-

tiffs alleged that the trial court erred in admitting extrinsic
evidence as to the circumstances surrounding the agreement.

-12-

The

Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding:

fl

[T]hough argua-

bly clear on its face, where the parties demonstrate by their
actions, that to them the contract means something quite different, the intent of the parties will be enforced."

Ld. at 1195.

See also, Builough v. Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 308, 400 P.2d 20, 23
(1965); Hardinqe Co. v. Eimco Corp., 1 Utah 2d 320, 323, 266 P.2d
494, 496 (1954).
While this rule is restricted to contracts deemed
ambiguous, the Utah Supreme Court observed:
The question becomes ambiguous to whom?
Where the parties had demonstrated by their actions and
performance that to them the contract meant something
quite different, the meaning and intent of the parties
should be enforced. In such a situation, the parties
by their actions have created the ambiguity to bring
the rule into operation. If this were not the rule,
the courts would be enforcing one contract when both
parties have demonstrated that they meant and intended
the contract to be quite different.
Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 268, 501 P.2d
266, 271 (1972) (emphasis added).
Despite this clear axiom of contract construction, the
trial court held that the evidence of the consistent interpretation given to the Restoration Clause by both Unisys and Olds was
immaterial.

Tr.11-58 to 63.

This evidence would have demon-

strated that Unisys always understood that the Restoration Clause
of the Sublease was inserted for the Landlord's benefit. Unisys1

-13-

Real Estate Manager told Olds' Chief Executive as recently as
October 27, 1986

that the Landlord had the option to "waive the

paragraph and accept all the improvements provided by Sperry."
Exhibit P-6 (emphasis added).

Additional evidence not admitted

at the hearing was proffered to substantiate this view.

Tr.11-58

to 63.
Olds offered evidence that Unisys repeatedly conceded
Olds1 right to waive the Restoration Clause and to relieve Unisys
from its obligation to restore the Premises.

Yet at the hearing,

the trial court rebuffed all attempts by Olds' counsel to introduce this relevant evidence.

When Olds' counsel attempted to

cite Utah law on course of performance, the trial court summarily
rejected the evidence.

The following dialogue indicates the

court's view that the current litigation between the parties
negated any prior common understanding of the contract meaning:
MR.BLACK:
[Olds' Counsel]:

THE COURT:

Now, . . . the Utah Supreme
Court, on numerous occasions,
stated that when the parties
arrived at a construction or
interpretation of the documents, that is the construction interpretation that will
be given the document and I
would be happy to cite cases
on it.
No. You can't honestly tell
me the parties agreed on the
construction of any paragraph
in this case, can you?
-14-

MR.BLACK:

I think that we can because I
think there's additional
correspondence.

THE COURT:

Let me ask Counsel.
speaking for you?

MR.WANGSGARD
[Unisysf Counsel]:

Is he

He certainly is not, your
Honor.

THE COURT:

I know he can't be speaking
for him because I read the
documents, too.

MR.BLACK:

I think this shows that the
parties had an understanding
of what the agreement was.

MR.WANGSGARD:

It's just immaterial.

THE COURT:

The court will sustain the
objection.

Tr.11-59 to 60.
The court apparently concluded that since the parties
currently disagree over the proper construction of their contract, evidence showing a past common understanding was not relevant.

In every lawsuit involving a current disagreement over

contract terms, uncontroverted evidence of past agreement as to
these terms is the best evidence of what those terms mean.
Unisys' counsel did not offer any evidence to controvert Unisys'
prior acknowledgement that Olds could waive restoration; he simply asserted that all evidence of that acknowledgement was
immaterial:
-15-

MR.BLACK:

Did he [Mr. Maguire] state to
you that Olds Properties could
waive the restoration clause
of the sublease?

MR.WANGSGARD:

Objection.

THE COURT:

Sustain the objection.

MR.BLACK:

Immaterial as to whether they
thought that they could waive
restoration? That's the precise issue before the Court,
your Honor.

Immaterial.

Tr.11-62 to 63.
The district court's ruling on the Motion to Dismiss
was based on the court's erroneous construction of the text of
the Restoration Clause and its failure to recognize the significance of the letter acknowledging Olds' right to waive Unisys'
obligation to remove improvements.

Utah law establishes that the

parties' course of action is the best evidence of the meaning of
the lease terms.

Zeese, 534 P.2d at 90. The trial court erred

in holding this evidence immaterial and in ignoring Unisys'
admission contained in Exhibit P-6.
C.

The Appellate Court Reviews Written Documents Without
Deference to the Trial Court
In reviewing the interpretation of a written document,

the appellate court need not defer to the trial court's determination.

Gump and Ayers Real Estate, Inc. v. Domcoy Investorsr

733 P.2d 128, 129 (Utah 1987); Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 P.2d
-16-

1149 (Utah 1986).

Rather, the appellate court examines the writ-

ten document on its own to determine its meaning.
The lease agreement between the parties is evidenced by
at least four writings, all of which were before the trial court
and are before this Court for de novo examination.

The documents

include (1) the Original Lease between Deshon Properties Corporation and General Motors Corporation, (2) the Sublease between
General Motors and Sperry Rand Corporation, (3) the Attornment
between Olds and Unisys, and (4) the letter from Unisys to Olds
stating that Olds could waive restoration and accept all improvements.

This Court's examination of these documents and applica-

tion of the law of waiver and of course-of-performance will show
Olds1 entitlement to waive the Restoration Clause and retain the
improvements.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATING THE
PARTIES' UNDERSTANDING OF THE RESTORATION CLAUSE CONSTITUTES
REVERSIBLE ERROR
On review, the appellate court should reverse a ruling

if a trial court has excluded evidence in abuse of its discretion.
1977).

Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Utah
In the case at bar, the trial court abused its discretion

by excluding the evidence offered to prove the interpretation of
the Sublease.

-17-

The exclusion of the additional evidence Olds sought to
introduce precluded Olds' right to a fair hearing.

Denial of a

party's reasonable opportunity to introduce evidence in a hearing
on an injunction requires reversal.

Thus, the Fourth Circuit

vacated a preliminary injunction in Consolidated Coal Co. v. Disabled Miners of SW Virginia, 442 F.2d 1261 (4th Cir. 1971),
because the trial court did not allow the parties sufficient time
to present their proof.

See also Kohan v. Rimland School of

Autistic Children, 430 N.E.2d 139 (111. App. 1981).
By refusing to hear evidence of the common construction
given to the Restoration Clause by both parties, the trial court
abused its discretion.

This Court should reverse and remand with

directions to consider all the evidence of how the parties interpreted the Sublease.
III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ITS ERRONEOUS
INTERPRETATION OF THE ATTORNMENT
The Attornment provides that the Sublease shall be the
primary lease between the Landlord and the Tenant, "provided,
however, that those provisions of the prime lease which do not
diminish Tenant's obligations or Landlord's rights under the sublease shall be deemed incorporated into the sublease."
P-4.

Exhibit

This proviso thus incorporates only pro-Landlord provisions

of the Original Lease into the Sublease.
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Section 10.02 of the Original Lease, entitling the Tenant to remove any and all machinery, equipment and fixtures at
the end of the lease, is a provision for the benefit of the Tenant, since absent such a provision, under the common law, permanently attached fixtures become part of the underlying realty.
Ravi v. Shull Enterprises, 108 Idaho 524, 700 P.2d 567 (1984);
Lienman v. Lienman, 201 Neb. 458, 268 N.W.2d 108 (1978); Van
Kappel Company v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1183 (D.Md. 1971)
(Missouri law). Section 10.02 permits the Tenant to remove permanently attached fixtures even if doing so would damage the
building.

Because this provision substantially diminishes the

Landlord's rights, Section 10.02 does not survive the Attornment
and is not incorporated into the Sublease.
The trial court ignored, however, the selective incorporation principal of the Attornment.

Rather, the court stated:

"paragraph 10.02, I think its applicable."

Tr.11-118. This

holding directly contradicts the terms of the Attornment.
The trial court's ruling did not mention the
Attornment.

Rather, the trial court stated that Section 10.02

was incorporated into the Sublease based on the "subject to" language of the Sublease.

That clause simply states that the Sub-

lease is made "subject to all the terms and conditions of the
underlying lease."

Exhibit P-2, Addendum F.
-19-

The court stated

that "subject to" means the "defendants are bound by the terms of
the original lease, those that are of value to it as well as
those that are value [sic] to the lessor." Tr.11-118.
The trial court's analysis misconstrues the "subject
to" language in the Sublease.

The Sublease is made "subject to"

the original lease in order to make clear that the sublessor may
not grant the subtenant any more rights than the sublessor
received in the original lease.
subject to the original lease.

Thus, all Subleases are made
The "subject to" clause does not

purport to incorporate the Original Lease into the Sublease.
In any event, the Attornment is the most recent of the
lease documents and therefore controls any contrary or conflicting provisions in earlier documents.

Only the Attornment deals

with the issue of which provisions of the Original Lease are
incorporated into the Sublease.

The district court erred in

ignoring the Attornment and applying paragraph 10.02 of the original lease to the dispute.

This error warrants reversal and an

order granting the injunction.
CONCLUSION
The trial court misconstrued the Alteration
Clause, the Restoration Clause, the mutual understanding of the
parties, and the Attornment.

The court also disallowed
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introduction of critical evidence demonstrating the mutual understanding of the parties.
WHEREFORE, appellant Olds Properties Corporation prays
that the order of the District Court be vacated and the matter be
remanded:
1.

With instructions to enter the injunction; or

2.

For a new hearing consistent with this Court's rul-

ing that:
(a)

Unisys has no right to alter the Prem-

ises without Olds1 permission,
(b)

Unisys established Olds1 right to waive

the Restoration Clause by its letter of acknowledgement
and Olds was therefore entitled to waive restoration of
the Premises and to keep the improvements,
(c)

All course of performance evidence

should be admitted, and
(d)

The Attornment superseded any right to

remove fixtures contained in Section 10.02 of the Original Lease.
DATED this J±

day of September, 1988.

Warren Patten
Michele Mitchell
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
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Arnold P. Messing
Brian P. Rosman
CSAPLAR & BOK
One Winthrop Square
Boston, Massachusetts 02110
Of Counsel
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 8th day of September,
1988 I caused to be hand delivered a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant Olds Properties Corporation, to:
Chris Wangsgard
Thomas E. Nelson
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
50 South Mail Street, Suite 1600 «,

MM:082588C
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IMUTHOINUSA

*E> 4 70

, dated . ..

D*Cmb«r 2D

, 1972

betweenCiai£R/L JM07P&S CQ&fQ&mOH. • D«t«v*r« Corporation, with
principal

oiflcea at J044 V«tt Crand fiaalevantf Dttroit* KUhlfcan

W202 _
hereinafter called the Lessor, and -

S P C R g ? 1AHD C C S P O S A T I M (D&tYft?

Vto*t **Uln£ atSdraaa la P. 0. Box 500, l l u *

tell,

PUUiOFl)

FaanayWaala

L9422
hereinafter called the Lessee,

Witntzzttt):
Lessor hereby lets to Lessee and Lessee hires from Lessor the following described premises

PREMISES

Sea Exhibit

USE OF
PREMISES

to be used only for

M

A" attachad barato acid cad* a part haraof.

offleav warehousing and light manufacturing

for the term commencing

January 1, 1973

Decaabar 31, 1977*
RENT

of

and expinnj

la th* avaat poaaaaaloa of *

at the yearly ren

WKSTT 01TC TBOUSAKD TVO KUXBRCD FIFTY and 00/100 DOLLARS ($91,2:
4t7 604 17

payable in equal or proportionate installments of

•' •
Dollars in advance on thi

first business day of each and every month during the term

fat

clauaa

tVaaty*third

§pa<

raaarvad*
PROVIDED ALWAYS, and Lessee hereby covenants as follows
PAYMENT
OF RENT

FIRST To pay the rent as aforesaid to Argonaut Realty Division of General Motors Corporation

REPAIRS

*it LLSJUL s lApcnsc to keep the premises in good repair, ordinary »car~a»4 tear< repair*
to the roof, 1 NirniMnTTTn1 Imildmy jindjitructural repairs excepted, unless such repairs are made necessary
by the act or negligence of the Lesseeand aTlhe ua^ura^ionof the term to remove its goods and effects and
peaceably yield up the premises to the Lessor in as cnoiTTrmrTPnrm as itjinidrl ivrrrd to Lessee, ordinary
wear and tear damage by fire the elements act of the public enemy or casultTry'lrxLepved^^llnotices tc
quit or vacate being hereby expressly waived any law usage or custom to the eontrary notwithstanding

COMPLIANCE
* I T H REGULATIONS

THIRD To compK promptly w ith all laws ordinances requirements ind regulations of the Kdera
State Count> Municipal and other authorities the fire insurance underwriters ind nn\ insurance or^in
izations or associations* except that ijp-ooot.' ohall not be required to make an* «ilu*ra4»ons to Uu ^xUr4«r-o

VIFWING
PREMISES

FOURTH To use the premises exclusively for the purpose set forth herein and during the last three
months of this lea^ or any extension thereof to permit the lessor to display the usual To Let signs and
to show the premise o to prospective tenants I e^sce further agrexs th it at any time during the term Lessor
Lessor s landlord 01 tl ur agents ma> enter the premises for the purpose of examining the condition thereof,
or to make repairs in n> part of the building but in making such reservation Lessor does not assume any

fecW^f^lt^c wes^TtfS'jfvicS^ «rcme^?0£.lBA'-iteil'\nSes<iptc of cocrcnccwr.t hci
in, the recital r*Le for audi partial eouth ot occupancy a'jftli ba

RIDER ATTACHED TO AND MADE A PART OF SUBLEASE AGREEMENT DATED
DECEMBER 20, 1972, BETWEEN GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, AS
LESSOR, AND SPERRY RAND CORPORATION (UNIVAC DIVISION), AS
LESSEE.

TWENTIETH: Repairs - The Lessee at Lessee's expense
shall keep the premises including the grounds, buildings,
structures and improvements thereon in good order and condition and shall make all repairs, replacements and improvements required, structural or otherwise. The Lessee will
at the expiration of this Lease, surrender and deliver said
premises with the building and aforesaid improvements,
appurtenances and equipment in good order and condition,
reasonable wear and tear excepted. The Lessee agrees not
to call upon the Lessor at any time during the term of
this Lease to make any repairs or replacements of any part
of the premises or improvements thereon, whether structural
or otherwise, this being a Net Lease. The intention being that
the rent received by the Lessor shall be free of any expense
in connection with the care, maintenance, operation or repair
of the premises or any improvements thereon.

TWENTY-FIRST: Alterations - That Lessee will not make
any alterations or add any construction whatsoever to the
premises without the prior written consent of the Lessor,
and in each instance, such a request for consent shall include
a set of plans, specifications and cost of any contemplated
improvement, and if the Lessee makes any alterations or adds
any construction, such additional construction or alterations
shall be removed at the expiration of the term and the premises
shall be restored at the sole expense of the Lessee to the
condition existing prior to Lessee's taking possession, except
for improvements of the following nature which shall remain
on the premises at the time Lessee vacates the premises:
(1) Any additions, expansions, or alterations to restrooms.
(2) Changes in Interior layout to produce
a cafeteria and lunchroom.
(3) Heating and air conditioning units
installed in the roof of the warehouse.
(A) Any column mounted power distribution
equipment or any main power feeds brought
into the building.
(5) Any fencing done to the property.
(6) The Lessee may pave a portion of the
"expansion area", located on the north
side of the building. The Lessee must

ADDENDUM

A

submit detailed plans and specifications
for this paving, and the Lessor agrees
to share in the cost of this paving on
a 50/50 basis with its share not to exceed $8,000.00, payment to be made upon
submission to the Lessor of paid invoices
along with lien waivers from all subcontractors.
TWENTY-SECOND: Insurance - Lessee shall maintain insurance
with respect to the premises of the following types and In
the following amounts:
(a) Fire insurance with extended coverage
in an amount not less than the full
insurable value of the premises (excluding excavations and foundations).
(b) Such insurance as will fully protect
Lessor against damage caused by explosion of boilers, heating apparatus
or other pressure vessels on the premises,
such Insurance to afford protection to the
limit of not less than Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00).
(c) Insurance covering public liability as
will fully protect Lessor, and Lessee
against claims of any and all persons
for personal injury, death, or property
damage occurring in or about the premises,
or In or about any adjoining streets,
sidewalks and passageways, such insurance
to afford protection to the limit of not
less than One Hundred Thousand Dollars
($100,000.00) for injury to one person and
Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000.00)
for Injury to more than one person in one
accident, and Twenty-five Thousand Dollars
($25,000.00) for damage to property.
(d) Such other Insurance as will customarily
be carried In times of International strife
or war by owners and operators of similar
property.
Notwithstanding the limits for Insurance specified
herein, Lessee agrees to Indemnify Lessor against all damage,
loss or liability resulting from any of the rlsk6 referred to
herein.
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SPERRY CORPORATION
WORLD H6A0OUARTERS
BLUE BELL PENNSYLVANIA 19424-0001
TELEPHONE (215) 542-4011

October 27, 1986

John H. 0, LaGatta
Olds & Co • , Inc.
595 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10022
Re:

Sperry Leased Facility
845 North Overland Drive
Morth Salt Lake City, Utah

Dear Mr. LaGatta:
Sorry for the delay in responding to your most recent
correspondence; however, I was waiting for legal counsel to
review our sublease agreement.
According to counsel, Sperry is obligated to complete tne
restoration of the facility in accordance with the provisions
of the restoration paragraph unless you as landlord waive this
right. It is also their opinion that the restoration should be
completed by the end of the lease term, can be started at any
time, and landlord consent is not required. With regard to
landlord's right to waive, it is limited to waiving of the
entire clause.
Sperry is planning to move the current manufacturing operation
from this location to their main site in Salt Lake city. Plans
are to have the move completed by April, 1987. At the present
time we are evaluating the facility and trying to determine how
best to eliminate or substantially reduce our remaining rental
obligation. At the present time, Sperry is considering two
options: (1) Retain real estate brokerage firm and market the
property as an ongoing manufacturing facility. This, however,
will require landlord to waive Sperry's restoration obligations
and provide suitable leasing terms beyond the current lease.
(2) Utilize the facility for remote storage or sublease as
storage space and commence restoration obligations in
accordance with ongoing needs of the facility.
; order to proceed with one or the other, it would be helpful
if you could establish your position on the restoration clause,
i.e., do you want Sperry to restore in accordance with the
provisions of that clause or are you willing to waive that
paragraph and accept all the improvements provided by Sperry.
If you are agreeable to the latter, it seems to me that we
could enter into an agreement with a real estate broker so that
they could market the property on a long term basis.
PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
ADDENDUM B
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With regard to your inquiry relative to properties Sperry might
consider a sale/leaseback, at the present time there are no
properties that are earmarked for a sale/leaseback. If any
lowever, it is unlikely that we would
become available, he
consider your firm until we have a satisfactory resolution of
the North Salt Lake City facility.
Very truly yours,
- , /

-' •?' S-^

E. H. Maguire
Manager
Real Estate

-

EHM/kmm
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTftiCTre6UR*:!Vl{-9^^K

1
2

IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY

3

STATE OF UTAH
-oOo-

4
5
OLDS PROPERTIES CORPORATION,
a Delaware corporation,

6

)

7
Plaintiff,

]

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF
PROCEEDINGS

)
]
]

Civil No. 41895

8
vs.

9
UNISYS, a Delaware
corporation, a successor in
interest of SPERRY-RAND
CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation, and JOHN
DOES I - X,

10
11
12
13

I

Defendants.

!

14
15

BE IT REMEMBERED thait on Monday, September 28, 1987,

16

the above-entitled matter came on for HEARING in the Second

17

Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, State of

18

Utah, before the HONORABLE DOUGLAS L CORNABY, Presiding.

19 1
20
21

* •

1

A P P E A R A N C E S :
For the plaintiff:

DAVID 0. BLACK
Attorney at Law
1245 Brickyard Road
Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

For the defendants:

CHRIS P. WANGSGARD
Attorney at Law
50 South Main Street
Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah .84145

22
23
24

* *

25

Nancy H. Davis, C.S.R.

COKTEKTS NOT FILMED

1

MR. BLACK:

Well, I will not—we will use them to

the extent that they are before the Court on the Motion to
Dismiss, although I have a difficult time understanding how
the Motion to Dismiss can include information that goes beyond
the bounds of the pleadings without it becoming a Motion for
Summary Judgment, and, therefore, if it becomes a Motion for
Summary Judgment, I would object to them based upon the fact
that they are hearsay and I have not had a chance to crossexamine the affiants or voir dire them in connection with
those documents, so, I object to them being before the Court
on the basis of a Motion to Dismiss because they are clearly
inappropriate for a Motion to Dismiss.
MR. WANGSGARD:

Well, they are proffered as business

records and I have alleged foundation.
THE COURT:

The Court overrules any objection for

purposes of the Motion to Dismiss just as for the Summary
Judgment, they are appropriate and they can be responded to by
opposing affidavits if a person wants to.
Q

(By Mr. Black)

Go ahead.

Mr. LaGatta, I show you what has

been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 6.

Would you identify that

document?
A

Yes.

This is a letter from Mr. Maguire of Unisys to

me dated October 27, 1986.
Q

Have you reviewed that letter?

A

Yes.
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Q

And was that letter caused to be retrieved from you

by your business records?
A

It indeed was.
MR. BLACK:

It's this one.

Move for its admission of Plaintiff's

Exhibit No. 6.
MR. WANGSGARD:
THE COURT:

No objection.

It may be admitted.
(Whereupon, Plaintiff's
Exhibit No. 6, previously
marked for identification,
was received into evidence.)

Q

(By Mr. Black)

Calling your attention to the final

paragraph on Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 6, if I might give the
Court a copy of that exhibit.
THE COURT:

I already have one,

It's part of the

things we were just talking about, isn't it?
one.

Here.

Keep that

I am using the one that is part of the affidavit of

Edward Maguire.
Q

(By Mr. Black)

Calling your attention to the final

paragraph on the first page of that exhibit, did you have a
discussion or does the final paragraph of that exhibit refer
to the restoration clauses of the sublease that is Plaintiff's
Exhibit No. 2?
MR. WANGSGARD:

I am going to have to object.

I may

not understand the question, but it seems to be a question
that this paragraph of the exhibit speaks for itself.

55
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THE COURT:

Sustain the objection.

MR. BLACK:

I would like to read it into the record,

what it states, and then I will ask Mr. LaGatta what caused
the conversation or the negotiations that are a topic of that
paragraph, if I might.
THE COURT:

Go ahead.

MR. BLACK:

"In order to proceed with one or the

other, it would be helpful if you could establish your
position on the restoration clause, i.e., do you want Sperry
to restore in accordance with the provisions of that clause or
are you willing to waive that paragraph and accept all the
improvements provided by Sperry.

If you are agreeable to the

latter, it seems to me that we could enter into an agreement
with a real estate broker so that they could market the
property on a long term basis."
MR. WANGSGARD:

I don't know where you are.

I don't

think you are in the exhibit.
MR. BLACK:

Right there at the bottom.

MR. WANGSGARD:
Q

(By Mr. Black)

restoration clause.

Oh, okay.
That paragraph refers to a

What restoration clause is it referring

to?
A

That would, of course, be the restoration clause in

the sublease which had become the lease because the other
lease, the prime lease, was made out of the exhibits.
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MR. WANGSGARD:

THE COURT:

I
4

be stricken.

e

question asked.

Move the

based upon?

Sustain the objection.

The answer may

Proffering information and it's going beyond the

MR. BLACK:

6

I'm sorry.

I missed that.

8

MR. WANGSGARD:

g

MR. BLACK:

Xo

Foundation.

answer be stricken.

2

n

Objection.

What was your objection

I was thinking o f —

I move the answer be stricken.

Ask if I could have his objection read,

if ! might.

H

(Whereupon, Mr. Wangsgard's objection was read

X2

by the Court Reporter.)

13

Q

(By Mr. Black)

And I call your attention to the

14

restoration language in Paragraph—the final paragraph of

15

Exhibit 7 that is before you.

13
17

MR. WANGSGARD:

are not talking about the final paragraph of Exhibit 7 a n d —

18
19
20

Counsel, first of all, I think you

MR. BLACK:

The final paragraph on the first page of

Exhibit 6.
Q

(By Mr. Black)

I call your attention to the

21

language referring to the restoration clause.

22

restoration clause, if you know, was being discussed in this

23

letter?

24
25

MR. WANGSGARD:

Objection.

What

The document speaks for

itself.

57

THE COURT:

Sustain the objection.

MR. BLACK:

Your Honor, I submit the document

doesn't speak for itself because there can be many restoration
clauses and that document does not specifically refer to a
restoration clause.
MR. WANGSGARD:

But, this document has to speak for

itself because what he is purporting to do is to have
Mr. LaGatta tell the Court what another person intended when
they used those words in this letter.

That's why the letter

needs to speak for itself and we shouldn't have other
witnesses trying to explain what somebody else meant.
MR. BLACK:
Q

Why don't I rephrase the question.

(By Mr. Black)

Mr. LaGatta, had you previously had

discussions with Mr. Maguire regarding the restoration clause
referred to on the last paragraph of the first page of
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7?
A

Yes.

Q

And would you recount to the Court in general, the

terms of those discussions, if you can, date of the
discussions and where you had them with Mr. Maguire.
MR. WANGSGARD:

Just a second.

Objection.

Immaterial.
THE COURT:

Sustain the objection.

We seem to be

now talking about what the negotiations are between the
parties; are we not?
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2

MR. BLACK:

there's additional correspondence.

2
4

I think that we can because I think

THE COURT:

Let me ask counsel.

you?

5

MR. WANGSGARD:

6

THE COURT:

7

I know he can't be speaking for him

MR. BLACK:

I think this shows that the parties had

an understanding of what the agreement was.

IQ\

MR. WANGSGARD:

H

THE COURT:

12

He certainly is not, your Honor.

because I read the documents, too.

g
g

Q

It's just immaterial.

The Court will sustain the objection.

(By Mr. Black)

I hand you what has been marked as

13

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7.

14

document.

15
lg

MR. WANGSGARD:

Would you please identify that

May I see what you are talking

about, please?

17
18

Is he speaking for

THE COURT:

What are you talking about so the Court

can refer to it?

19

MR. BLACK:

I will give the Court a copy in just a

21

THE COURT:

That's not what I already have?

22

MR. BLACK:

That's correct.

20

23
24
25

second.

Q

(By Mr. Black)

Would you identify that document,

please.
A

Yes.

This is a Unisys—Mr. Maguire's letter of

60

, l ? o / wn- y - *

I

tenant a i , ^

2

rrospLLt.Avc

2

me w a i v i r. _: i-'i-tor a t : o r:

4

„,

.• .-^-i

g

A

y

Q"

/.,^uiu.
• h*j series, y e s , ir.

,

,|

Ser i es < »1

*• h e f i r s t p d i u q i a u t r-rk i

g I agreement

J

arui

;. * res: ration

d e i 1 c e b a s e :i \ I p o i I p i: :i c • i

conversat^ui.. *,l(

g

it

cetera.

Q

g

' ^r c : o e r a t : o n w i t h , i

-kr<s ~

'

-*; • o h a 1 r oi

A

Aa i v -

: ; • - i rj -^

-apparent", .

r

rat i o n

'••hair of U n i s y s .

**

12

MR W A N G S G A R I -

^•biertion.

No f ^ i n d a t ^ - ,

The

131
a

; <"oru- ;

A:,,;-

;S

n a p p e n i iu .ow i

*~nat

^

• t: < m c

16|
17

i d e n t i f y iro

^g

j_ {-

w e re

ev

. t ;;>: ' •

j_ £ e n c e

-ryinq

t o H"^ • rn

. t o r r . ^ i, ;:

-i ;s

m

19 I
ntipuidt-1 r'

20

evidence-

21

documor *- T e a k ?

22

a i I :i .

. . _, i i ill y

23
24
25

t - -~^ ••

. r * : 'hat purpose and the
Any wt:*ua. proceeding is improper

: t je • : !:: it : •

MR. BLACK:

Apparently

P

: is bt.- - stipulated t • ;?

admission.
:

Okay.

I t may be adini t t e d on

u.

stipulation.
(Whereupon, Plaintiff's
Exhibit No. 7, having
previously been marked for
identification, was
received into evidence.)
Q

(By Mr. Black)

Mr. LaGatta, you indicated you had a

series of conversations with Mr. Maguire involving
negotiations ]regardingf the restoration clause of the sublease;
is that correct?
A

Resltoration, maintenance and many other things.

Q

Had Mr. Magulire discussed previously with you the

waiver of restoration under the sublease?
A

Yes

Q

And did he t>elieve it was your right to waive

restoration under the sublease?
A

Yes
MR. WANGSGARD:

Objection as to what Mr. Maguire

believed «and move the answer be stricken.
THE COURT:

Sustain the objection.

We will strike

the answer.
Q

(By Mr. Blac:k)

Did he state to you that Olds

Properties could waive the restoration clause of the sublease?
MR. WANGSGARD:

Objection.

Immaterial.

THE COURT:

Sustain the objection.

MR. BLACK:

Immaterial to whether they thought that

they could waive restoration?

That's the precise issue before
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THIS LEASE, Bade thia 16th jfty• \

March

f

1964,

between DESHON FROPEXTT CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation,
having i i in, ©filet in cara of Tha Prentice-Hall Corporation Systes,
Inc.,. 22/9 South Stata Straat, Dover, Dalavara (harain callad tha
1*saer n ) iiiioiKl UEHE1AL MOTORS C O R P O R A T I L

a Baleware Corporation,

having ita principal offica at 3044 West Gran I Bot .1 it i: i I, Detroit,
Michigan 48202 (harain callad tha l|ri L a a a a a I,! ) 9
U

*H « i S I "X" 1:

Lastor laaaaa to Laaaaa, and Leasee hires from Lassor,
for tha t e n , Mt tha rental, and subjact to tha provisions harain sat forth, ALL THAT CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAHD described in
EXHIBIT A annexed hereto and _ — * ^urt -hereof*
Together with all and singular tha building! ixiii I approvements, water, watercourses and riparian rights connected
therewith, privileges and advantages, with the appurtenances to
tht finis belonging or in anywise appertaining, m tct than ^ :l i included in the within letting any and all interest in and to tha
± any), and public street or streets

sidewelkt. curbs,
i
i
ticJe nhicj

ncerest acquired

-

i the

' arty to .

Jit

i by the

I0HN

T. K.OTR.
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PLAINTIFF
EXHIBIT

L

1

Section 10,02,

It is understood and agreed that the

Lessee| from time to time during the term of this Lease or any
extension thereof, suiy install machinery, equipment and fix* .
tures of various kinds and description for the purpose of
carrying on ita business, and upon any of such machinery,
equipment and fixtures being so installed in or pieced on the
leased premises by the Lessee the same shall remain at all
times the property of the Lessee, and, at any time during the
term or any extension or extensions thereof and at the termination of the Lease or any extension or extensions thereof, the
Lessee shall be entitled to remove any and all of such machinery, equipment and fixtures; provided, however, that if any
machinery and equipment is so attached to any building or
buildings so as not to be readily removable without damage to
the building or buildings, then, in such event, if the Lessee
shell remove the same, the Lessee shell promptly repeir and

•

replace any damage caused to the building or buildings by
such removal.

If the Lessee shall exercise its right to re- i

new this Lease beyond the initial term for any extended term!
or terms it shall not be necessary for the Lessee to reserve
its right to such machinery, equipment and fixtures or their
removal.
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»G2 -ccoroer

2a\; -

v

TENANT ESTOPPEL CERTIFICA.r: .. .-.:.. - :i~kJK:i:.i
_

^ ,,

690522
. \*- undersigned, as tenant
. -r+.ir.*
......
>.c: .din sublease ("Sublease") dated December 2C 13*" 2 ;n 1 :e
with General Motors Corporaticn ( "CM" ) , as landlord (GM 1—;
success::. \ :; 1:3 interest in the Sublease being
wetndlora"), does hereby certify t: andl- :3 and Prime 1-nalord (as defined h^*-^-» *-- ~~+-Qr- *
1.;:e Sublease (^s the same m^y have been amented,
modifier :r supplemented) is m full force ana effect a m
consists :: the documents set forth on Exhibit A hereto and
covers ~nhe premises (the "Premises"' iescribed :?. Exhibit 3
hei-r: .
Exhibit A also sets forth any consents given by
either part,
*:;y material actions for which such c c n s - ^
- was required .r;aer the Sublease and --11 documents cr a;:1
ments regarding any hypotheca*^ :r '-'• assignment of Tenan' s
interest :n ir.e Sublease
2.
The _ _.-j:.e^ement ^a .- -. tne Nuclease is T? .uarv 1,
1973, and t;>- ;urrent -exoiraticn date thereof cursuar.t t*. *:.-ame~T.m^r~ -escribe:! in Exhibit A here": . .~ March Tl 1^8C

"o T3
x —
~~ ••

he

:.*b*.ease ;:ai _wU *ie m r t n e r

.£ ~
i' Zz

"1
To the best of Tenant's knowledge, there is 1 10
monetary or material breach under the Sublease, whether on the
part of Landlord or Tenant.

c_ ^
0 CJJ

portion

«•.. _db not sublet or granted any license of any
-: a.l -1 M e ;remises, except as follows
NCNE

rer.ta.
-expenditures of Landlord reiniD'it iw»le
-y ^xm.;. has been prepaid before its due date under the
Sublease and all such rental ^~< expenditures have been paid
m r : u g h :~tob*a
-i*'"

'

-

let 0.3 I '
I iniJei

'Le jut lease,

8.
- - .emises nave ceen repaired and maintained in
c^mpiiar - *;th the Sublease, and to the best of Tenant's
knowledge
tne:e . * . structural or material defect in the
Pre- -<=^
j

Tenant has received no notice from any government ,ij
authority
. the effect that the Premises and or Tenant's use
thereof is unlawful.

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

^
V/^5~
y

->:

- I
.

ADDENDUM E
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168
10. To the best of Tenant's knowledge, there is no
threatened or actual action or proceeding against the Premises,
including, without limitation, any action or proceeding relating
to zoning, environmental, eminent domain or condemnation matters
(except the current Charlotte condemnation proceeding).
11. That Tenant has received a copy of that certain
Lease, to which the Sublease is subject, (the "Prime Lease")
dated March 16, 1964, between Deshon Property Corporation, as
prime landlord (Desho|i Property Corporation or any successor-ininterest to, or designee of, Deshcn Property Corporation, being
hereinafter referred to as "Prime Landlord") and General Motors
Corporation, as prime tenant.
12. If the Prime Lease shall be assigned, surrendered
or otherwise transferred to the Prime Landlord, then effective
simultaneously with such assignment, surrender or other transfer,
and without any further act of any other person, Tenant shall be
deemed to have attorned to the Prime Landlord upon Prime
Landlord's acceptance thereof as hereinafter provided and the
Sublease shall continue as a lease between Prime Landlord, as
lessor, and Tenant, as lessee, containing the same terms and
conditions of the Sublease; provided, however, that those provisions of the Prime Lease which do not diminish Tenant's obligations or Landlord's rights under the Sublease shall be deemed
incorporated into the Sublease. The foregoing provisions of this
paragraph shall (a) inure to the benefit of any Prime Landlord,
(b) apply notwithstanding that, as a matter of law, the Sublease
may terminate upon the assignment, surrender or other termination
of the Prime Lease, and (c) no further instrument shall be
required to give effect to said provisions. Upon demand of Prime
Landlord, Tenant agrees, however, to execute, from time to time,
instruments in confirmation of the foregoing provisions of this
paragraph reasonably satisfactory to Prime Landlord, in which
Tenant shall acknowledge such attornment and shall set forth the
terms and conditions of its tenancy.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Tenant has caused this instrument to
be signed in its corporate name by Richard T,. Seaberg
, its
President, whose signature has been attested to
by
girharri J. Marchek
, its (Assistant) Secretary,
this y
day of y^i>. ^/-^ •_ , 1984.

ATTEST:

(Assistant) Secretary

SPERRY CORPORATION*

~

President
Defense Products Cfroup
^Formerly Sperry Rand Corporation; name change effective Aug. 1, 19'
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ZW Sublease t dated

....DfcCMbflr

10

-

, 1971

betweenGEKm..)!^

,

Iftth

p::i : l o ei pili ofIlcea...at..3A44...V*tt..firAi»l..AHil«Mrdf
4«202._

I M1. to 1,1, MU.fei.tf.tt...

_

hereinafter called the Lessor, and

.-

.

IPOtHY 1 M B C O ^ ^

Vka9.t..jM.tUBC.«4dr«as ! • ff...O...Jto. J ^
UA22

_

„

hereinafter called the I essee,

Ij^mn

PREMISES

$m

bcrpln U-is to Lessee and l-w^see • **s iiurn l-«r**>r the following described premises:

ixhibli

I il lie it:: i in lie 11 isi f i

'A atUchttd bcr«>.

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
JZ

J£L

use or

25:

£c#. varaboutLiig atid Light manufacturing
I*

JM"

1 >

•. * ftm < omi T •" c-" t

*

.~.

."

PREMISES

..7T

.„.

January l» 1973
:**

\\

_..

,

,

"

and expiring

"la th« avant poaaaaaioa of •
:.

a t the yearly rent

HZ TOOBSAKD TWO KUXORSO FIFTY *od 00/100 0OLLAIS ($91,25<
RENT
payable in equal or proportionate installments of

*.*..•.?fV.„.?.*...
Dollars in advance on the

first: business day of each and every month during the term.

I t * clauaa t v a a t y - t h i r d AfMic
raaarvad*

P R O V I D E D AI WAYS, and I essee hereby covenants as. follows:
PAYMENT
OF RENT
REPAIRS

F I R S T : T o pay the rent, as aforesaid to A rgonaut Realty Division of General Motors Corporation
mpmii m j» • ' r iiji'o jjiii t'f! Lrp#'iri t h i i r

f^ii''#iwwii»aiiiii<ii<Bi «if* \m\\Sfkd^fm fii"" c m a if

ifs-if f i i ••* ** •»* * %.* ».«***•» *% w\jri #• **.*%.*» ^jtjxr%f%. xXJLm

to the roof, exterior oTTnT1 UuiUko&jma^structural repairs excepted, unless such repairs are made necessary
by the a c t or negligence of the Lessee aruTaTThc ej^aiia^ionof t h e term t o remove its goods and effects and
* ably yield up the premises to the Lessor in as good rnnTTTTrrm as Ttjfcu^TdrlivrTrd to Lessee, ordinary
ind tear, damage by fire, t h e elements, act of the public enemy or casualTy"!** i r\ >U'iL,ajlnotice» to
tuit or vacate being hereby c.Mpre»iy~^wm^
t o the eontittfy-nuiwiihsiSiRI
COMPLIANCE
WITH REGULATIONS

T H I R D : T o comply promptly with all laws, ordinances, requirements and reputations of the Federal,
State, C o u n t y , Municipal and other authorities, the fire insurance underwriters, and any insurance organizations or associations* except that ijfrooti* ohalJ not be f4/qyir«i44»~«al^^-^^
^ ft 1 tOri 3 Of '"I

VIEWING
PREMISES

F O U R T H : To use the premises exclusively for the purpose set forth herein and during the last three
months of this lease, or any extension thereof, to permit the Lessor to display the usual " T o L e t " signs and
to show the premises to prospective tenants. Lessee further agrees th.it at any time during the term Lessor,
Lessor's landlord, or their agents, may enter the premises for the purpose of examining the condition thereof,
or to make repairs in any part of the building, but in making such reservation, Lessor does not assume any

fc^'^^iikTCc2
^t-^s^nfijsio/v^be i^r^i^ o£Su^i (e OT« s da t e of cocrcericec^rct her
: , the recital r*?.e fvt n icb p a r t i a l c o u t h of occupaacy a!-all b t

NOTICES

F I F T E E N T H : That all notices to be eiven hereunder by either partv shall be in writing and gi
by personal delivery to the Lesse e/(£?£enWfq»<? exeS&We £§&&& Jfel&&§Por
shall be sent
telegram or by registered mail addressed to the party intended to be notified at the post office addi
of such party last known to the party giving such notice and notice given as aforesaid shall be a si
cient service thereof. Provided, however, that it is mutually agreed that the Lessor appoints
Executive in Charge of Real Estate and the Manager and the Director, Real Estate Department
Argonaut Realty Division, General Motors Corporation, 485 West Milwaukee, Detroit, Michigan 48
as its agents and that any one of them may give all notices and receive all notices to be given h
under, and may receive the rent, and notices shall be sent to any one of said agents and not otherw
The right is hereby reserved by the Lessor to countermand such appointments and make others c
sistent herewith, due notice of which shall be given by the Lessor to the Lessee.

TERMINATION

S I X T E E N T H : If at any time proceedings in bankruptcy, or pursuant to any other act for
relief of debtors, shall be instituted by or against Lessee, or if Lessee shall compound Lessee's debt1
assign over Lessee's estate or effects for payment thereof, or if any execution shall issue against Lei
or any of Lesse^ c effects whatsoever, or if a receiver or trustee shall be appointed of Lessee's prope
or if this lease shall by operation of law, devolve upon or pass to any person or persons other t
Lessee personally, then and in each of said cases, Lessor may terminate this lease forthwith by nol
ing Lessee as herein provided. Upon such termination all sums due and payable or to become due
payable by Lessee shall at once become due and payable.

SUBLEASE

S E V E N T E E N T H : This is a sublease and the Lessor's interest in the premises is as Lessee w
an underlying lease made by.DeS.hoH..P.rop.eX.ty. .CO.rp.OratiO.U > ...fift..l.e.$.8.Qr^...ftn4_

General Motors Corporation,.as.. Lessee

, dated March.lfi.f....L9.fiL4

copy of which, initialed for identification, is attached hereto. This sublease is expressly made subjei
all the terms and conditions of said underlying lease and the Lessee agrees to use the premises ir
cordance with the terms of said underlying lease and not do or omit to do anything which will br
any of the terms thereof. If said underlying lease is terminated, this sublease shall terminate si
taneously and any unearned rent paid in advance shall be refunded to the Lessee, provided that s
termination is not the result of a breach by Lessee of the within sublease.
QUIET
POSSESSION

E I G H T E E N T H : Lessor hereby covenants that Lessee upon paying the rent as herein rese
and performing all the covenants and agreements herein contained on the part of the Lessee may qu
enjoy the premises, except as herein otherwise provided, and subject, however, to the terms of the 1
to Lessor, and to the terms of any mortgages which may now or hereafter affect the premises.
N I N E T E E N T H : The Lessor and the Lessee waive all rights, each against the other,
damages caused by fire or other perils covered by insurance where such damages are sustained in
nection with the occupancy of the leased premises.

FOR ADDITIONAL CLAUSES SEE RIDER ATTACHED HERETO AND MADE A
PART HEREOF.
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